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Notes
Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced-Guidelines
for University Disciplinary Proceedings
In the wake of student activism and campus disorders, par-
ticipating students have frequently sought judicial relief when
subjected to adverse university disciplinary proceedings.' In
some instances, the proceedings were precipitated by disruption
of the university's functions.2  In other cases, the university
acted because of rule violations occasioned by "off-campus" ac-
tivities.3 In either situation, however, judicial review of the
exercise of discretionary authority by university officials rep-
resents a departure from the earlier treatment afforded student
claims for relief.4 Prior to 1961, the courts would inquire only
into the adequacy of the procedure afforded before suspension or
expulsion.5 Since attendance at an institution of higher learn-
ing was regarded as a privilege,6 however, these inquiries in-
1. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
La. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 68 Civ. 1877 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ist D.
Ct. App. 1967); S. LIPSET & S. Woim, The Berkeley Student Revolt
(1965); Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CAuT. L. REV.
1 (1966). See also E. WIL.AMSON & J. CowAN, THE AMERiCAN SrTU-
DENT'S FREFDOM OF EXPRESSION 91 (1966), which indicates that univer-
sity administrators are apt to be least tolerant of campus demonstra-
tions.
2. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968); Zan-
ders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968);
Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Greene v. Howard
Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967).
3. Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla.
1963); Knight v Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945
(D.C.M.D. Ala. 1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
4. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
North v. Board of Trustees, 137 IMI. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891); Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ.,
224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
5. See 58 A.L.R.2d at 909. "The cases involving suspension or
expulsion of a student from a public college or university all involve
the question whether the hearing given to the student was adequate.
In every instance, the sufficiency of the hearing was upheld." See also
Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students-Rights and Reme-
dies, 38 NOTRE DAM LAW. 174, 175 (1962).
6. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950
(D.C.M.D. 1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (1961), where the court held "[t]he
right to attend a public college or university is not in and of itself a
constitutional right."
A similar issue has been raised concerning the arbitrary dismissal
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variably resulted in the upholding of the validity of any regula-
tion, including those giving the institution power to dismiss a
student at any time and for any reason.7 Because of a pre-
sumption of "reasonableness," the assertion by responsible of-
ficials that a regulation tended to promote the general good of
the institution was sufficient to satisfy the limited judicial
standards.8
Recently, a reappraisal of the importance of education,
coupled with expanding protection in other areas of law, has
fostered more elaborate procedural and substantive safeguards
than existed in the past. Every court has recognized that "[a]
university has inherent general power to maintain order and to
formulate and enforce reasonable rules of student conduct."9
Beginning with Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,10
they have defined the procedural protection that must be af-
forded and, to a lesser extent, have imposed limitations on the
substance and scope of regulations.
of a teacher from a public institution. The courts have held that pro-
cedural due process is a prerequisite regardless of the characterization
of state employment as a "right" or a "privilege." See Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
7. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(1928); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220
(1923). The court in Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W.
204, 206 (1913) succinctly stated that "[w]hether the rules or regulations
are wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter left solely to the discretion of
the authorities. . . ." Other courts have simply concluded that the
judiciary cannot consider the merits of a college's exercise of discre-
tionary authority at all. DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626
(D. Mass. 1957); State ex tel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263
P. 433 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928) (review only where
action is arbitrary or abusive). "So long as they [college authorities]
act in response to sufficient reasons and not arbitrarily or capriciously
their acts may not be interfered with by the courts." Frank v. Mar-
quette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 377, 245 N.W. 125, 127 (1932).
8. It is usually said that the dismissal may not be in bad faith,
and should not be arbitrary or discriminatory; but what actually con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion is left unstated. Note, Expulsion of Stu-
dents From Private Educational Institutions, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 898,
899 (1935). But see, State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309
(1886); Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Cty. Rpts. 77
(1887).
9. Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202
(M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See Note, Private Government on the
Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L,J. 1362,
1395-1409 (1963).
10. 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Seavey, Dismissal of
Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957).
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The purpose of this Note is to assess at the outset the present
posture of the law towards the procedures employed in dismissal
action. It will then consider current and proposed standards
for evaluation of the substantive content of regulations. In
short, it will seek to determine to what extent courts will under-
take to decide whether university rules and their enforcement
are reasonable.
I. APPLICABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
THROUGH STATE ACTION
Students who claim violations of their rights and freedoms
generally invoke the fourteenth amendment, which provides that
no state may deprive an individual of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Its applicability to an academic
setting depends upon the resolution of two threshold questions.
The first is whether a student's continued presence in an
academic institution is a judicially cognizable interest warrant-
ing constitutional protection. The second is the extent to which
due process guarantees will be applied to "private" institutions.
A. RIGHT V. PRIVILEGE
Not infrequently, university administrators have attempted
to justify a student's dismissal by asserting that school atten-
dance is a privilege, revocable at will, and not a legally pro-
tected right.' 2 If attendance were in fact a privilege, then the
due process clause would be inapplicable, since it requires either
the infringement of a legally cognizable right or the involvement
of a substantial interest. The question of whether procedural
due process must be afforded before exclusion or dismissal has
arisen in many contexts besides student-university relations:
employees in Federal Government;' 3 teachers in state universi-
ties; 14 and doctors in medical associations.' 5 In these settings,
11. "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 294 U.S. 245 (1934);
North v. Board of Trustees, 137 ILL. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891); Board of
Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, affd, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
13. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
14. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v.
Updegraf, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Court in Wieman reasoned that
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to
public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that consti-
1968]
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if the court denied relief or reinstatement, it was on the ground
that membership or employment was a privilege not a right,
and hence not judicially protected.'6
Courts have gradually recognized the central importance of
education to future success. In Brown v. Board of Education,17
the Court observed that "[i] n these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education."'Is Increasingly, the courts
have held that a person's interest in preserving his educational
opportunities is more than a privilege.19
It is a truism that in this country the luxuries of yesterday are
the necessities of today, and it would seem that the matter of
higher education, more than almost any other subject, equates
itself completely and appropriately with [Mr.] Justice Holmes'
"felt necessities of the time."20
Thus, the trend has been away from simple privilege analysis,
which affords protection only under traditional concepts of prop-
erty or contract rights, and towards a growing awareness of
tutional protection does extend to the public servant whose
exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrim-
inatory.
Id. at 192. In Slochower, the Court concluded that "[t]o state a person
does not have a constitutional right to government employment is only to
say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory
terms laid down by the proper authorities." 350 U.S. at 555.
15. Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d
791 (1961).
16. Compare Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 946
(1960) with Dixon v. Alabama State 3d. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1961). See also Davis, Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70
HARV. L. REv. 193, 222-33 (1956).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Id. at 493. Although the Brown decision involved primary and
secondary education, it is almost unquestionable that the Court's state-
ment is equally applicable to a college degree today.
19. Zanders v. Louisiana State Ed. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp.
649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
20. Crane v. Crane, 45 Ill. App. 2d 316, 327, 196 N.E.2d 27, 33 (1964)
(dissenting opinion). In considering the obligation of divorced parents
to provide their children with the opportunity for a college education,
the court in Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 458-59, 118 So. 2d 769, 773 (1960),
concluded:
It is a duty which the parent not only owes to his child, but to
the state as well, since the stability of our government must de-
pend upon a well-equipped, a well-trained, and well-educated
citizenship .... The fact is that the importance of a college
education is being more and more recognized in matters of
commerce, society, government, and all human relations, and
the college graduate is being more and more preferred over
those who are not so fortunate.
[Vol. 53:301
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educational opportunity as an emerging right.21 The Dixon
court considered the nature of the interests involved and the
nature of the proceedings necessary to terminate those interests
and stated that "the precise nature of the private interest in-
volved in this case is the right to remain at a public institution of
higher learning where the plaintiffs were students in good
standing."22 In Knight v. State Board of Education,23 the court
rejected the distinctions drawn between privileges and rights
and held:
Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privi-
lege, the fact remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable
value.... Private interests are to be evaluated under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of
labels or fictions, but in terms of their true significance and
worth.24
B. STATE ACTION TaEom s
Since attendance at a university is an interest worthy of con-
stitutional protection, the question becomes to what extent consti-
tutional safeguards will be applied to institutions not operated
by the state. "State action" is not confined exclusively to actions
taken within or by state established and administered institu-
tions, but may include actions taken by state officials or
agencies performing official functions under color of law or
custom in other contexts.25 In recent years, the doctrine of state
action has undergone considerable expansion.26 This has been
matched by a corresponding increase in contacts-in the form of
grants, tax exemptions, research funding, and the like27 -between
21. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (1961);
Knight v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961).
22. 294 F.2d at 157.
23. Knight v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174
(M.D. Tenn. 1961).
24. Id. at 178.
25. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943), which held that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment, as now
applied to the states, protects the citizen against the state itself and all
of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted." See also Slochower
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
26. The doctrine of "state action" has been stretched considerably
by United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Burton v. Willing-
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
27. Higher Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 1219; Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 363.
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"private" institutions and state and federal governments. Accord-
ingly, a number of grounds are now available on which to base
findings that actions by officials in private institutions consti-
tute state actions thereby requiring compliance with consti-
tutional mandates.
The clearest example is when the relationship between the
institution and the state is such that the state, or its officials,
have direct or indirect control over the institution. This control
may be present where the institution is funded by the state,28
or where it is run by officials or agents of the state.29 Even
absent control through funding or administration, there may
be sufficient state control over particular institutional activities
to invoke constitutional limitations.3 0
When financial or administrative regulation is absent, courts
have still found that the presence of certain relationships be-
tween state and private institutions may justify findings of
state action. When certain levels of participation by the state
are present in a private enterprise, courts may find an inter-
relatedness that requires imposition of constitutional limita-
tions.31 The relationship may also derive from the appearance
of state involvement.3 2  Thus, where private schools receive
28. In the case of state land-grant colleges, where the administra-
tive officials are state officers, the requisite direct control is evident.
Indirect control was present in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), where a public
library administered by an independent board of trustees was dependent
upon the city for appropriations to meet expenses and salaries. In
Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Cty. Rpts. 77, 79 (1887),
state funding of Dickinson College, a "private" school, was sufficient to
impose procedural due process requirements, although the decision
was not based on constitutional grounds.
29. In the first Girard College case, funds for the school were derived
from a private endowment established by the will of Stephen Girard.
However, because members of the institution's board of directors were
also officials of Philadelphia or Pennsylvania, there was sufficient state
involvement to prohibit implementation of the discriminatory terms of
the will. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
30. In Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), govern-
ment action was found when a bus company broadcast to its "captive"
audience because a state commission had regulatory control over the
bus and its broadcasts.
31. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (segregated park form-
erly run by the city and still dependent on city maintenance crews was
"public" although administered by a private board of trustees); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant with
parking facilities operated on property leased from state could not be
used in a racially discriminatory manner).
32. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), the private park in
question was adjacent to a public park and they had formerly been ad-
ministered as one. A more recent case involving Girard College,
[Vol. 53:301
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state and federal funds, tax immunities, or rights of eminent
domain, an appearance of state involvement may be created
which will lead to a finding of state action.33
An alternative method of finding state action is a deter-
mination that a "private" institution fulfills a "public function."34
The public function doctrine has extended constitutional guar-
antees to citizens of towns wholly owned and administered by
private companies,35 and to segregated state primary elections
run by "private" political clubs.36 As the Court in Brown v.
Board of Education observed, "Today, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.13 7
Thus, where a private institution undertakes to perform this
function, it may be required to do so in a manner consistent with
constitutional constraints. Judge J. Skelly Wright so held in
finding that Tulane University, a "private" institution, had
sufficient contacts with the state and performed enough of a
public function to be subject to constitutional requirements.3 8
He doubted
whether any school or college can ever be so "private" as to
escape the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment .... [I]nstitu-
tions of learning are not things of purely private concern....
No one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected
with the greatest public interest. And this is true whether it
is offered by a public or private institution .... Clearly, the
administrators of a private college are performing a public func-
tion. They do the work of the state, often in the place of the
state. Does it not follow that they stand in the state's shoes?
And, if so, are they not then agents of the state, subject to the
constitutional restraints on governmental action. .... 39
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), found state
action even though the school was administered by a private board of
trustees. The court based its decision on the same grounds as Evans:
that there was both the appearance and the fact of state involvement.
33. In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), the court found state action
from financial assistance provided by the state and federal govern-
ments, and from the finding that the hospital was chosen for its ability
to carry out the state's policy of allocating medical resources.
34. Private ownership or operation of a facility impressed with a
public interest does not ipso facto remove it from the reach of the four-
teenth amendment. See, e.g., Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n,
347 U.S. 971 (1954); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
35. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
36. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
37. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
38. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855
(E.D. La. 1962), judgment vacated and new trial ordered, 207 F. Supp.
554 (E.D. La. 1962), affd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd
on retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
39. 203 F. Supp at 858-59.
1968]
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The court in Pennsylvania v. Brown,40 the most recent Girard
College case, found state action on a public function theory,
based on the finding that the "private" services rendered
"would otherwise have to be performed by the public school
system. .. ."
Despite the possibility of finding state action in the actions
of private schools, the two most recent decisions have upheld
the public-private distinction for constitutional purposes. In
both Greene v. Howard University4 1 and Grossner v. Trustees
of Columbia University,42 student demonstrators sought injunc-
tive relief from school disciplinary actions in a Federal District
Court. In Greene, Judge Holtzoff held that expulsion without
notice or hearing was permissible because Howard University
was a private school.43 He found Howard University was a
private corporation rather than a governmental body. The fact
that "annual appropriations are made by Congress . . ." and
"the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is given
authority to visit and inspect Howard University and to control
and supervise the expenditure of those funds" did not change
Howard's status as a "private" corporation, free of constitutional
limitations.44  The decision, presently on appeal, has been se-
40. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
41. 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967) (presently on appeal).
42. 68 Civ. 1877 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43. 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967).
44. Id. at 612. It should be noted, however, that Howard Univer-
sity is a creature of the Federal Government. Howard University and
the Federal Government are inseparably bound to each other by 20
U.S.C.A. ch. 8. For example, Howard University must file annual reports
to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (20 U.S.C.A.
§ 121); it must report all receipts and disbursements to the Secretary
of HEW, including those not derived from the Federal Government
(20 U.S.C.A. § 121); it may not apply its federal appropriations to reli-
gious purposes (20 U.S.C.A. § 122); the Secretary of HEW has "author-
ity to visit and inspect" Howard Univeisity and to "control and super-
vise the expenditure therein of all money" paid under congressional
appropriations (20 U.S.C.A. § 122); Congress makes annual appropria-
tions to Howard University for construction and maintenance (20 U.S.
C.A. § 123); the Office of Education of the Federal Government may
inspect Howard University at any time (20 U.S.C.A. § 123); in the
application of the Civil Service Retirement Act and Federal Employees'
Group Life Insurance Act, employees of Howard University's Freed-
man's Hospital are regarded as federal employees [20 U.S.C.A. § 125
(c)]. Howard receives direct "operating appropriations from Congress
-$13,334,000 in 1968; the University requires its faculty members to
execute appointment affidavits on Standard Form 61, U.S. Civil Service
Commission; it is connected to the Interdepartmental Dial System (IDS)
which connects all Government agencies; the Department of Defense
Telephone Directory includes Howard in the category of "other Govern-
ment agencies (at xvii); the "Official Congressional Directory" lists
[Vol. 53:301
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verely criticized for its disregard of all concepts of state action.45
In Grossner, a petition for a preliminary injuction restrain-
ing Columbia University, a private institution, from expelling
students involved in campus disturbances46 failed for lack of
federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs had sought to show that the
degree of state involvement in Columbia, in the form of massive
financial support, was sufficient to justify viewing university
action as state action.47 Speaking through Judge Frankel, the
court rejected this argument on the basis of its finding that the
requisite degree of state participation and involvement was lack-
ing. The court was particularly impressed by the fact that
Columbia is administered independently and autonomously by a
private board of trustees.
It appears, therefore, that state action theories have not yet
been extended to institutions of a private character.48 At least
in Greene, however, the court used different standards for de-
termining state involvement than are used in other contexts,
such as racial discrimination. As educational needs continue to
expand, as private schools become increasingly dependent on
state and federal resources for their continued existence, and as
they continue to provide opportunities not offered by the state,
their private status, presently a barrier to fourteenth amend-
ment requirements, will gradually be eroded.49 As this has not
Howard University under the Department of HEW, Congressional Direc-
tory, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1967, at 579.
Given these indicia of connection, involvement and control, the
finding of a lack of federal involvement, resulting in the denial of due
process safeguards, can only be viewed as ludicrous in the extreme.
45. 54 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 145 (1968); Developments-Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1059 n.20 (1968).
46. See New York Times, April 27, 1968, at 1, col. 3-4; April 25,
1968, at 1, col. 7-8; April 24, 1968, at 1, col. 5-6.
47. In both 1966 and 1967, nearly half of Columbia's total income
was derived from public sources. Plaintiffs also relied on other public
benefits, such as research grants and a lease from New York City of
public lands for the construction of the gymnasium that touched off the
entire controversy. 68 Civ. 1877 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
48. But see Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Cty.
Rpts. 77 (1887), which found that a college receiving financial aid from
the state could not dismiss a student except after a hearing or trial in
accordance with a lawful form of procedure.
49. See Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Dif-
ferent View, 54 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 143, 146 (1968); Developments-Academic
Freedom, 81 HAnv. L. REV. 1045, 1071 (1968); Comment, Procedural
Limitations on the Expulsion of College and University Students, 10
ST. L.U.L.J. 542, 547 (1962). Professor Byse's analysis is that "although
the concept of 'state action' is in the process of a development that
eventually may make the due-process limitations applicable to dismissal
1968]
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yet occurred, except as otherwise indicated, the remainder of
this discussion will be confined to institutions of a clearly public
nature.
II. EARLIER THEORIES OF STUDENT-UNIVERSITY
RELATIONS
The legal power to administer a public university may be
found either in the state constitution,50 or legislative enact-
ments.51 These measures generally provide broad authority and
discretion for the management of educational institutions, and
the courts have normally deferred to that discretion and re-
frained from intervening in internal university disciplinary pro-
ceedings. When cases have come before the courts, several
theories have been employed to express the legal relationship
between the student and the university. The most common
theories supporting college disciplinary authority characterize the
relationship as either in loco parentis52 or contractual.
5 3
A. In Loco Parentis
According to the theory of in loco parentis, the university
stands "in the place of the parents" and makes such rules for the
well being and development of the student as the parents could
make for the same purposes.54 The merits of disciplinary reg-
proceedings conducted by so-called 'private' colleges and universities,
that development has not yet come to fruition."
50. E.g., M]nW. CONST. art. 8, § 4.
51. E.g., OpE. REV. STAT. § 3520.010 (1965).
52. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Il. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891); Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
53. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(1928); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A.
220 (1923). See also Note, The College Student and Due Process in
Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 438; Comment, Administra-
tive Law-Judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in Student Discipli-
nary Hearings, 43 No. CAR. L. REV. 151, 152 (1964).
As a result of a student's reliance and investment of time and
money, some courts have found an implied contract, wherein the
university promises to award a degree in return for the student's satis-
factory completion of the prescribed academic requirement and his
compliance with school regulations to which he has impliedly con-
sented as a precondition of admission and graduation. See, e.g., Booker
v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909);
People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hospital Medical College, 60 Hun. 107,
14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
54. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640
(1924). The student in this case brought action against the president
of the University for the economic tort resulting from his expulsion.
[Vol. 53:301
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ulations are left to the discretion of the authorities or the
parents as the case may be. 5 Institutional exercise of the
parental control is also justified on the ground that it is vital to
adequate performance of the institution's duties.56 It is said
that the institution must possess parental powers "to enable
[it] to discharge these duties effectually, [since it] must neces-
sarily have the power to enforce prompt obedience. . .... 57 Dur-
ing the heyday of the in loco parentis rationale, the university
was viewed as a surrogate parent, combining the functions of
the home, the church, and the police.58 Accordingly, broad
powers were necessary. At present, however, as the trend
toward "multi-versities"-with their large, self-contained settings
and thousands of students-continues, it is doubtful that the
assumptions upon which the doctrine was based are still valid.
Although courts have frequently overlooked them, there are
limits to university disciplinary powers under in loco parentis.
Since the restraints operative in a parental relationship are not
present in the academic setting, the discipline should be subject
to scrutiny as to the nature and extent of punishment and the
methods adopted for its administration. 59 If the school's author-
ity cannot exceed that of a parent, then the use of suspension or
The court observed that "college authorities stand in loco parentis and
may make any regulation for their government [or betterment of
their pupils that] a parent could make for the same purpose .... " In
North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 306, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891), the
Illinois Supreme Court denied a student's claim for reinstatement on
the ground that
By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there
by those having the right to control him, he necessarily surren-
ders very many of his individual rights. How his time shall be
occupied; what his habits shall be; his general deportment; that
he shall not visit certain places; his hours of study and rec-
reation,-in all these matters, and many others, he must yield
obedience to those who, for the time being, are his masters....
55. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). See
also Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866), wherein the court
stated, "we have no more authority to interfere than we have to con-
trol the domestic discipline of a father in his family." Id. at 187.
56. See, e.g., Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 A. 882 (1924);
Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902).
57. State ex rel. Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150, 156 (1878). See
also Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D.
Ct. App. 1967); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968).
58. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2
LAw IN TRANs. Q. 1, 3 (1965).
59. See, e.g., Landers v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122 (1859). "The school-
master has no such natural restraint. Hence he may not safely be
trusted with all a parent's authority, for he does not act from the
instinct of parental affection."
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expulsion as a mode of punishment would be almost entirely
eliminated. Parental "expulsion" is the most extreme recourse
in the family setting. Thus, the severance of relations with a
student should be used by the university only under the most
aggravated circumstances.60 When adult students are involved,
university disciplinary power is even more severely circum-
scribed, since the parents themselves could not legally exercise
disciplinary authority.0 1 Moreover, if a minor student acted
with his parents' consent, there would be no basis for insti-
tutional regulation of conduct, either because no power had
been delegated or because the parents had "occupied the field. 01 2
Because of the inapplicability and inappropriateness of the
doctrine of in loco parentis as a legal analogy, the judicial current
has moved away from deciding cases on this basis. Notwith-
standing the fact that the doctrine still has its staunch ad-
herents,63 it has been so thoroughly repudiated by the courts
as to be presently devoid of any legal merit.0 4
B. CONTRACT
Courts have also relied with some frequency on a contract
60. ". . . [A] parent may not lawfully do the very act which the
university frequently tries to accomplish in asserting its purported loco
parentis authority-sever all ties." Goldman, The University and the
Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L. REv. 643, 651
(1965). See also N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 32, 33 (McKinney 1964);
Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 &IARv. L. Rav. 1045, 1145 (1968);
Note, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of Univer-
sity Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J.'1362, 1380 (1963).
In Commonwealth ex tel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Cty. Rpts. 77,
87-88 (1887), the court specifically considered this fallacy. "It might
well be a subject of discussion what is meant by parental discipline
when applied to a man who has attained his majority; and even in the
case of a minor son, the circumstances would be rare, which would de-
mand an expulsion from the parental roof and the hospitalities and
association of home."
61. E. BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW 101 (1961). See also Van Al-
styne, supra note 58, at 17-18; Note, supra note 60, at 1380.
62. State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. Rep. 309 (1887).
But see Curry v. Lasell Seminary Co., 168 Mass. 7, 46 N.E. 110 (1897).
63. Williamson, In Loco Parentis-That Wonderful Institution, 7
STUD. GOV'T BULL. 18 (1962).
64. The courts in Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo.
1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st
D. Ct. App. 1967); have all considered the doctrine and rejected it sum-
marily. In Zanders, the court concluded that "... the doctrine [of in
loco parentis] is of little use in dealing with our modern 'student rights'
problems." 281 F. Supp. at 756.
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theory to describe the relationship between student and school.6 5
When this approach is used, the terms are derived from the
"traditional" relationship or long standing customs of the
schools, and are considered as adopted by the student's act of
enrollment. 6 Where possible, however, courts find an express
contract, whose terms are contained in college catalogues, bul-
letins, or other university documents6T This type of literature
usually reserves broad discretionary powers in the university.68
65. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
La. 1968); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
66. Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120
N.W. 589 (1909); People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College,
60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
The court in Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 515,
522, 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 144, 154-55 (1901) stated the terms of the contract.
He [the student], upon making that contract, agrees to submit
himself to the reasonable discipline of the school. He agrees
that his conduct and character shall be such as to in no manner
be a detriment to the school; and this conduct and character he
must bear in all his relations with the school and with the other
students. He agrees that he will conform to the customs of the
school; if it is the custom of the school that the professors
shall discipline the scholars, reprimand and inflict such punish-
ment as is proper under the circumstances, then he has agreed
that he will conform to that custom. And he agrees that when
he fails in any of the duties devolving upon him, the authori-
ties over the school may discipline him in such manner as shall
be proper under the circumstances.
The university agrees with him that it will impart to him
instruction; that it will aid him in the ordinary ways of his
studies; that it will treat him fairly; that it will give to him
every opportunity to improve himself, and that it will not im-
pose upon him penalties which he in no wise merits, and that
it will deal with him impartially (emphasis added).
67. Steier v. New York Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959);
DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Anthony
v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Goldstein v.
New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902); Frank v. Mar-
quette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
68. In Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403
(Sup. Ct. 1962), where Catholic students were expelled for participating
in or witnessing a civil marriage, the catalogue of St. John's University
provided:
In conformity with the ideals of Christian education and con-
duct, the University reserves the right to dismiss a student at
any time on whatever grounds the University judges advisable.
Each student by his admission to the University recognizes this
right. The continuance of any student on the roster of the
University, the receipt of academic credit, graduation, the grant-
ing of a degree or a certificate, rests solely with the powers of
the University.
See also Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 122, 122 A.
220, 221 (1923). "The college reserves the right to exclude at any




For example, a clause may be included which permits the insti-
tution to expel the student "at any time, for any reason deemed
sufficient to it, and no reason for requiring such withdrawal
need be given."69
The contract analogy distorts the true nature of the relation-
ship between student and university. Contract rules were de-
veloped in a commercial context for the purpose of lending
certainty to the relationships between persons with relatively
equal bargaining strength. Application for admission to a uni-
versity is far removed from the market place which contract
law envisages. Because the "terms" are incorporated in cat-
alogues and bulletins, there can be no negotiation. The result
is contracts in which the dominant party dictates the terms, or
reserves the right to perform or not perform at will. Under
traditional contract doctrines, reservation of power to terminate
at will may result in an illusory promise or a contract that is
invalid for want of consideration. Moreover, inequality of bar-
gaining power may result in contracts whose terms are unrea-
sonable, unconscionable, or void as against public policy.70 Such
a view could be taken of a contract requiring, as a precondition
of admission, waiver of all student rights.71 This type of problem
has given rise to a general doctrine of contracts of adhesion. 72
In a contract of adhesion, inequitable provisions may be dis-
regarded since "it has been held as a matter of common law that
unconscionable contracts are not enforceable. s73 Indeed, under
69. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(1928). The student-plaintiff was disciplined because she "was not a
typical Syracuse girl." See also DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp.
626 (D. Mass. 1967).
70. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942);
Jessel v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 App. Div. 378, 95 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1950); UNIFORMol COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
71. "When one considers the relative bargaining power of the par-
ties and the ability of the student to effect any change in the terms of
his admission, the analogy to the yellow dog labor contract is obvious.
If such waiver provisions are not so outrageous as to be unenforceable as
opposed to public policy and traditional standards of fairness, the courts
might well refuse to enforce them on grounds of unconscionability."
Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students-Rights and Reme-
dies, 38 NoTRE DAME LAW. 174, 179 (1962).
72. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 230 (d) (1932); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
In Niedermeyer v. Curators of State Univ., 61 Mo. App. 654 (1895),
the court recognized the inequality of bargaining positions and held that
the school was required to deal fairly and in good faith with its stu-
dents.
73. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448
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strict contract law, the student might even stand to benefit.
The school, by expelling the student, would be repudiating the
contract or seeking rescission. The burden of proof would then
be on the institution to show the student's breach, instead of
the present requirement that the student prove he has not
violated any university regulation.7 4
III. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO REVIEW
Until recently, the judiciary has been extremely reluctant
to review university disciplinary proceedings.7 5 Judicial passiv-
ity can be attributed to the fear that court intervention would
undermine institutional authority and autonomy.7 6 This fear
derives from several sources. The first is the belief that the
university must maintain certain conditions to fulfill its educa-
tional goals. The courts have wisely refrained from substituting
their judgment for the educational expertise of the adminis-
trator.7 7 Particularly in academic matters, schools have an ad-
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (unconscionable); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (void as against public policy).
Perhaps the foremost authority in the field of students' rights, Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, has suggested that in coming years, boilerplate clauses
in university bulletins will not stand as a defense against dismissed
students:
The unconscionable quality of such a clause, the non-negotiable
character of the contract, the evident inequality of bargaining
power, and the importance of the student's interest in securing a
degree under reasonable conditions-all these considerations
increase the likelihood that typical boilerplate provisions may
so antagonize the court as paradoxically to operate to the dis-
advantage of the college.
Van Alstyne, Student Rights and University Authority, 2 COL. COUNSEL
44, 55 (1967). See also Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and
the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 2 LAW iw TRANS. Q. 1 (1965); Van Alstyne, Procedural
Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 368
(1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963).
74. Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1146
(1968).
75. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2
LAw iN TRANS. Q. 1, 2 (1965).
76. General surveys of the bases for judicial non-intervention are
contained in Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930); Developments-Academic Freedom, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1148 (1968); Developments-Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 986-90 (1963). See
also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159-65 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
77. Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
In Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967), Judge
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vantage in evaluating student conduct and performance.78 A
second and related reason is that judicial review of institu-
tional decisions may lead courts into Professor Chafee's "dismal
swamp" where judicial logic, applied to internal conflicts, may
lead to extreme results. Historically, educational institutions
have had a great deal of freedom and autonomy, derived from
the notion that academic freedom is a sine qua non of intellectual
advancement. Both legislatures and the judiciary have respected
this feeling and accordingly have minimized their intervention.
Some educators have suggested that judicial review of exer-
cises of discretion will result in a surfeit of frivolous cases
flooding the courts.7 9 In a recent address, Professor Clark Byse
responded to that fear by stating that
due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It
is the best insurance . .. against those blunders which leave
lasting stains on a system of justice but which are bound to
occur on ex parte consideration.SO
He concluded by agreeing with the "general proposition that in
appropriate instances students should seek judicial vindication
of basic interests."8'
Although institutional autonomy should be preserved, it does
not follow that judicial review will defer indefinitely to internal
academic "house-cleaning." As the court in Zanders v. Louisiana
State Board of Education8 2 declared:
If minimum standards of fairness, having been repeatedly artic-
ulated for over fifty years, are not afforded to students in dis-
Holtzoff observed that "it would be a sad blow to institutions of
higher learning and to the development of independent thought and
culture if the courts were to step in and control and direct the ad-
ministration of discipline .... "
Similar deference was accorded by the Court in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957):
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
Universities is almost self-evident. No one should underesti-
mate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation.
78. Edde v. Columbia Univ., 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup.
Ct. 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 777, 154 N.E.2d 448, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 956
(1959).
79. J. PERmns, THE UNmV SrTy AND DUE PROCESS, SUBIMITTED TO
AvIERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (1967).
80. Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different
View, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 143, 145 (1968), citing Shaugnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
81. 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. at 146.
82. 281 F. Supp. 747, 760 (D. La. 1968).
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ciplinary cases, then, as is becoming the rule rather than the
exception in all fields today, courts, state and federal, will draft
rules on an ad hoc, case by case, basis to insure that rights of
students adequately are protected.
IV. REASONABLY ENFORCED-PROCEDURAL
LIMITATIONS
Growing judicial recognition of the importance of education
and evolution in the protection of personal liberties have, to-
gether, contributed much to legal developments in the area of
student rights.8 3 Preservation of individual and civil liberties
has become a preferred constitutional value8 4 which can only
be abridged by state action when there is a compelling counter-
vailing state interest. In the context of the university, a stu-
dent's freedom must include freedom to learn, and by deriva-
tion, freedom to hear,8 5 to study, to write,8 to explore, 7 and
to exercise the rights of citizenship.88 Incidental to all these is
83 Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), with Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See also New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
84. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of
Education not excepted." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. at 637 (1943).
85. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.C. 1968) (speaker
bans); Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Egan v.
Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.S.2d
809, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964) (speaker bans). See also Pollit, Campus
Censorship: Statutes Banning Speakers from State Educational Insti-
tution, 42 No. CAR. L. REv. 179 (1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at
State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 328 (1963).
86. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (N.D.
Ala. 1967).
87. 50 A.A.U.P. BULL. 447 (1965); Monypenny, Toward a Standard
for Student Academic Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 625 (1963);
Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HA v. L. Ruv. 1045 (1968).
88. It seems reasonable to assume that a university regulation
which attempts to prohibit the exercise of a constitutional right would be
void. Thus, an attempt by a university to dismiss a student for his
participation in an off-campus political rally would violate the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. Cf. Dickey v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Hammond v.
South Car. State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
Courts have held that teachers can engage in political activity with-
out fear of reprisal or dismissal. See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
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the right of a free citizen to lead a life untrammelled by un-
necessary external constraints and invasions of privacy. It is
in the course of exercising these rights that the interests of the
university and the student may conflict.
In situations where conflict is not easily resolved, certain
legal formulas have been devised to protect the interests of the
parties involved. Developed through judicial construction of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the most com-
mon elements in the formulas are notice and a hearing. The
due process clause, however, is not a rigid formulation of min-
imum elements necessary to safeguard an interest. The strict-
ness of its requirements depends upon the nature of the interests
affected, the balance between the injury complained of and
result gained, and the availability of alternative procedures s9
It should be noted at the outset that the safeguards described
below are available only in disciplinary proceedings.90 Moreover,
since they lack educational expertise, courts should confine their
review to the nature of the proceeding, and reverse only when
it was manifestly unfair.91 They should also avoid making in-
dependent academic evaluations.9 2 However, even in the ac-
ademic setting courts have held that a student seeking read-
mission must be told why his application is denied and "afforded
an audience with the appropriate Administrative authorities. 93
177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Rackley v. School
Dist., 258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966); Williams v. Sumter School Dist.,
255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
89. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
163 (1951). The requisite elements of procedural due process are
determined by balancing of such factors as the precise nature of the
interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was
done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the pro-
cedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the
functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained
of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that
must enter into the judicial judgment. As Mr. Justice Douglas noted in
his concurring opinion, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951), ". . . it is not without
significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are proce-
dural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule
by law and rule by whim or caprice."
90. It is clear the provision of quasi-legal hearings for the review
of academic performance is uncalled for, although a modified hearing
system has proved effective for this purpose. Reichstein & Pipkin,
Appeals Day-A Study of Academic Justice, 2 LAW & Soc'y REv. 259
(1968).
91. Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
92. Samson v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 202 (1917).
93. Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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The landmark case in the area of student rights is Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education,"4 which specifically enu-
merated the elements necessary to provide adequate due process
in student disciplinary proceedings.95 A rash of recent cases has
greatly expanded and redefined these elements. Thus, a re-
evaluation of the procedures established by Dixon is now war-
ranted. The Dixon court held that there is a right to notice and
a hearing in university disciplinary proceedings considering
charges that could lead to suspension or expulsion. Although
there was some early dispute as to whether the notice had to be
in writing, or how timely it had to be,96 recent decisions have
held that notice must be in writing and must be served at least
one week prior to the actual proceedingY't The court in Jones v.
State Board of Education98 held as fundamental "that the ac-
94. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
95. Id. at 158-59.
[W]e state our views on the nature of the notice and
hearing required by due process prior to expulsion from a state
college or university ... The notice should contain a state-
ment of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven,
would justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board
of Education. The nature of the hearing should vary depend-
ing upon the circumstances of the particular case .... [A]
hearing which gives the . . . administrative authorities of the
college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail
is best suited to protect the rights of all involved .... [T]he
rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved with-
out encroaching upon the interests of the college .... [T]he
student should be given the names of the witnesses against him
and an oral or written report on the facts to which each wit-
ness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to pre-
sent .. . his own defense against the charges and to produce
either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his
behalf.
96. While the adequacy of notice is judged on a case by case basis,
notice is generally defined as "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
In Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1968),
where the Dean of Students was unable to notify students of pending
actions because they failed to provide the university with accurate ad-
dresses, as required by university rules, the court held that a good
faith attempt was sufficient under the circumstances. But see Wachtel v.
Noah Widows & Orphans' Benevolent Soc'y, 84 N.Y. 28 (1881), where
the notice was held invalid even though the party's failure to furnish
the association with his correct address was the reason he did not re-
ceive the notice.
97. Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381, 383 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (writ-
ten notice at least ten days in advance with an additional ten days pro-
vided for the student to respond); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 752 (W.D. La. 1968) (written notice at least one
week in advance); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp.
649, 657 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (written notice at least ten days in advance).
98. 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
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cused be granted adequate and timely notice of the charges
against him."99  Since the purpose of notice is to advise the
individual of the charges against him, a recitation of the factual
allegations and "a written notice of the precise charge" is es-
sential.10 0 In addition, it has been held that the notice must
refer to a specific rule or regulation, the violation of which
would justify disciplinary sanctions.101 Notice, in the broader
sense of promulgation and publication of regulations, has also
been a recent subject of judicial consideration. In Zanders v.
Louisiana State Board of Education,10 2 the court strongly rec-
ommended that "disciplinary rules and regulations adopted by a
school board should be set forth in writing and promulgated in
such manner as to reach all parties subjected to their effects."
Disciplinary rules must also define proscribed conduct with
some precision. Student-plaintiffs have attacked certain regu-
lations on the ground of vagueness, arguing that a rule "for-
bidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application violates due process."' 0 3 The court in Jones
held that "a university has inherent general power to maintain
order and to formulate and enforce reasonable rules of student
conduct,"'' 0 4 and concluded that school regulations could not be
held to the standard of precision required of criminal regula-
tions. In Dickson v. Sitterson,10 5 however, the court squarely
faced the issue of vagueness in overturning the University of
North Carolina's speaker ban.
Illustrative of the general problem of vagueness is the case
of Carr v. St. John's University, °0 where students were expelled
from a Roman Catholic institution for participating in a civil
99. Id. See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Esteban
v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
100. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
101. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D La. 1968).
102. Id.
103. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964); Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of
Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
104. 279 F. Supp. at 202. See also Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
105. 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Pollitt, Campus
Censorship: Statute Barring Speakers from State Educational Institu-
tions, 42 No. CAR. L. Ruv. 179 (1963).
106. 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802,




marriage. The regulation in question stated that "in conformity
with the ideals of Christian education and conduct, the Uni-
versity reserves the right to dismiss a student at any time on
whatever grounds the University judges advisable.' 11 7  The
lower court ordered reinstatement on the ground that a civil
marriage did not violate "Christian ideals," but the appellate
court reversed, reasoning that it was implicit that Roman
Catholic standards should be applied to the students.
In addition to notice, the Dixon court held that a hearing
was a prerequisite of due process. Its reference to a hearing
that preserves the "rudiments of an adversary proceeding" has
been the topic of continuing judicial exploration. One question
is whether the hearing has to be public. The main reason for
imposing such a requirement is the increased likelihood that the
results would be accepted both by the individuals in question
and the student body. 08 The universities, on the other hand,
have argued that open hearings would turn each case into a
cause celZbre, resulting in disruption of the educational proc-
ess.10 If, in a given case, it appears that the university's fears
are justified, it should at least insure public dissemination of
the issues, arguments and resolutions.
The actual make-up of the hearing board has also been a
topic of discussion. The commentators have uniformly sug-
gested that the board should consist of students as well as
faculty.1 0 The courts, while not as egalitarian, have held that
the board should not include administrators or deans directly
involved in the case, nor should they be allowed to sit on the
tribunal making the final determination."'
107. 34 Misc. 2d 319, 321, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
108. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st
D. Ct. App. 1967).
109. Id. See also Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
110. See, e.g, Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and The
Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Con-
siderations, 2 LAW ix TRAxs Q. 1 (1965).
111. But see Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967),
where a fair hearing was denied because of this commingling of prose-
cutorial and adjudicatory functions. See also Morey v. School Bd.,
276 Minn. 48, 148 N.W.2d 370 (1967); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of
Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (dictum). Administrative
tribunals have been invalidated where members have a direct interest
in the litigation. Johnson v. Milk Marketing Control Bd., 295 Mich. 644,
295 N.W. 346 (1940). Courts have held that a tribunal will be found
biased if it can be shown that the person who originally brought the
charges was also a member of the tribunal. Gaestel v. Brotherhood of
Painters, 120 N.J. Eq. 358, 185 A. 36 (Ch. 1936); Blenko v. Schmeltz, 362
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Increasing consideration has also been given to the actual
conduct of the hearing itself. Substantial questions have been
raised regarding the use of witnesses, the right to confront
accusers, discovery, cross-examination, and assistance of coun-
sel. Schools have argued against allowing the student to present
witnesses on his own behalf on the ground that they would not
be subject to compulsory process and hence could not be com-
pelled to testify.112 Schools have also argued that they could
not sanction perjured testimony.1 13 Neither of these arguments
is persuasive. The school could clearly require the presence of
faculty members or students at such a proceeding and the threat
of suspension or expulsion would adequately protect against
perjury." 4 If an outside witness were unwilling to appear then
the student or university would be without recourse; but this
does not justify failing to request attendance. Moreover, if the
outside witness had made the complaint in the first place, as is
often the case, his subsequent failure to appear would be grounds
for dismissal if no other evidence were available.
Similar resistance has been voiced against the right to con-
front the accuser. The argument against confrontation was up-
held in State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman,"5 where the court
found that "honorable students do not like to be known as
snoopers and informers against their fellows. . . ." Subsequent
courts, however, have uniformly held that such confrontation is
essential to due process and fair play.1 6
Pa. 365, 67 A.2d 99 (1949). See Administrative Procedure Act § 5(c),
5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1967).
112. State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp. 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433 (1928);
State ex rel. Englehardt v. Vermillion, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
The arguments in favor of the right of confrontation are far more per-
suasive. See Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of Students, 42 TEx.
L. REv. 344, 352-53 (1963); Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1045, 1139-40 (1968).
113. In point of fact, courts have upheld suspensions of students
refusing to testify or doing so falsely. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Helston, 32 Ill. App. 300 (1890); Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App.
Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902).
114. Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739
(1902).
115. 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942).
116. See, e.g., Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp.
190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F.
Supp. 649 (1967). As early as 1887, courts had recognized the desirabil-
ity of affording these procedures. In Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v.
McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 82 (1387), the court said the student
was entitled to know what testimony had been given against
him, and by whom it had been delivered, and that the proofs
be made openly and in his presence, with a full opportunity to




Because the right to witnesses and confrontation are now
uniformly afforded, the question has now become whether cross-
examination should be permitted. Cross-examination has been
characterized as central to an adversary system of justice and a
great discoverer of truth.117 It is in recognition of this that
most courts have permitted cross-examination." 18 Where stu-
dents have been aided by counsel, some courts have held that the
cross-examination must be conducted by the students, thus bar-
ring the lawyer from participating in the actual interrogation.
There has also been increasing judicial recognition of the
right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings." 9 It has been held
that when governmental agencies act as judicial bodies in deal-
ing with individuals they must use procedures traditionally
associated with the judicial process.120 Thus, universities, as
governmental agencies, have come to accept the importance of
assistance by counsel. The sole exception to this widespread
university and judicial acceptance of such assistance in disci-
plinary hearings is the recent case of Barker v. Hardway.'2' In
that case, the court denied the student-plaintiff's request for
counsel on the ground that an expulsion hearing was not a
criminal proceeding, 2 2 thus rendering the sixth amendment in-
applicable. The decision is in conflict with the general trend in
this area.
Courts have also required the allowance of a simple dis-
covery procedure. Generally, if the student is accused of mis-
conduct, courts demand that he be "permitted to inspect in
advance of any such hearing any affidavits or exhibits which
the college intends to submit at the hearing."'23  This has been
117. J. WIGMoRP, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
118. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
La. 1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
(N.D. Mo. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463(1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
119. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo.
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
120. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See also W.
GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1960).
121. 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968).
122. Id. at 237. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).




construed to mean not only the evidence to be employed, but
also a list of all witnesses and copies of their complaints and
statements.
Difficulties may also arise regarding the evidentiary stand-
ards to be employed and the use of evidence obtained through
a search of student residences. In Goldberg v. Regents of the
University of California,124 the court held that "there was no
merit to the contention that plaintiffs were deprived of pro-
cedural due process because the [disciplinary] committee did
not follow the rules of evidence . . . ." While strict conformity
to the rules of evidence is probably not possible in a proceeding
conducted by educators, some standard of relevance should be
required. At the very least, inquiry should be confined to
ascertainment of facts germane to resolution of the case. More-
over, some limits should be set on admissibility and the use of
"hearsay" evidence.
Much more serious questions are raised by searches and
seizures in dormitory rooms. Commentators have suggested that
a student's relationship to the university in matters of housing
should be that of landlord and tenant, thus insuring equality of
rights between students residing in dormitories and those living
in dwellings not under the control of the university.125  The
most recent decision on this question, however, held that a
reasonable infringement of the student's right of privacy would
be upheld. 126 The court rejected the argument that the relation-
ship was one of landlord and tenant, finding instead that "college
students who reside in dormitories have a special relationship
with the college involved?' 27  The court felt that the student's
right to privacy must be subordinated to the institution's interest
in fulfilling its educational responsibilities. In this case, the
search was conducted at the request of state police officers to
investigate "the possibility of there being marijuana on the
campus." The court condoned the search without warrant, re-
quiring as the standard for search, not "probable cause," but
a lower standard of "reasonable cause to believe."' 28 Even
124. 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
125. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643, 681 (1966).
126. Moore v. Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
127. Id. at 729.
128. See also People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 229
N.E.2d 596 (1967). In this case, a high school principal, suspecting the
presence of marijuana, consented to the search of a student's locker
over the student's objections. Obvious distinctions can be drawn, how-
ever, between searching a locker as opposed to a dwelling place, and
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recognizing the university's interest in preventing health or fire
hazards, several problems remain. To allow university admin-
istrators who are agents of the state to search on less than
"probable cause" is to permit them to do what officers of the
law cannot. Moreover, since the search in this case resulted in
the filing of criminal charges, the court effectively relegated
students to "second-class citizenship," at least as respects the
fourth amendment.129
The courts have also prescribed an appellate review process
for hearings not held before the university president or a board
given the ultimate power of dismissal. In these cases, a tape
recording or transcript is usually made to provide a record of
the proceedings. 130 In the event of an appeal, this allows the
court to determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient
to support the board's determination.
As evidenced by the foregoing, compliance with the re-
quirements of procedural due process requires university disci-
plinary proceedings to afford students a trial-type hearing safe-
guarded by the following guarantees:
(1) A written notice must be provided at least one week in ad-
vance of any hearing; the notice should specify the factual alle-
gations of misconduct and refer to the specific institutional rule
which the facts, as alleged, call into play.
(2) Prior to the hearing students must be afforded an opportunity
to inspect any affidavits or other evidence that the institution
intends to submit against him. He must also be provided with
a list of witnesses and copies of any statements or complaints
they have made.
(3) A hearing must be conducted by an appropriate tribunal.
It is not necessary that students be impanelled on such a board,
between the levels of supervision required in high school as opposed to
college. Moreover, in Overton, a search warrant, albeit defective, had
been obtained whereas in Moore there had not even been an attempt to
secure one.
129. It may, however, be possible for the student to suppress the
seized evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960), applies the fourth
amendment to the states, and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267
(1960) held that "anyone legitimately on the premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress when
its fruits are proposed to be used against him." The two cases together
seem to impose some limitations on a school's right to enter and obtain
evidence. See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1960);
United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (search of a secre-
tary's desk, without her permission, but with the consent of her su-
perior was unreasonable).
130. Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Mo. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463(1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
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but deans or administrators representing the institution's cases
should not be allowed to sit on the tribunal either.
(4) The student must be permitted to have counsel present at
the hearing and to seek legal advice during the course of the
proceedings.
(5) The student must be permitted to confront his accusers and
all witnesses.
(6) The student must be granted the opportunity to present his
own case, including his version of the facts, and any affidavits,
exhibits, or witnesses in support thereof.
(7) The student must be allowed to hear all evidence presented
against him and to cross-examine all adverse witnesses.
(8) The tribunal must make its decision solely on the basis of
facts presented to it and must provide a written finding of guilt
or innocence.
(9) Appellate procedures must be guaranteed and for that pur-
pose, a record of the hearing must be preserved.
Observance of these rules would greatly reduce the likelihood
that a court would overturn a university disciplinary determina-
tion on procedural grounds.
V. REASONABLE RULES-SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
The requirements of procedural due process have enabled
the courts to safeguard student interests while avoiding sub-
stantive questions concerning the nature of the regulated con-
duct. It is clear, however, that procedural guarantees alone do
not adequately safeguard student rights. Some attempt must
be made to inquire into the reasonableness, and indeed, con-
stitutionality of university rules. Obviously, problems of ac-
ademic performance and academic dishonesty such as cheating
and plagiarism are unique to educational institutions. These
evaluations should be left to educators because of their ex-
perience and expertise in such matters. This is not true, how-
ever, when academic sanctions, suspension or expulsion are em-
ployed to punish non-academic offenses. Indeed, the courts
have already entered into these areas.131 General limits on the
rule making powers of institutions are imposed by the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions and by concepts of equal pro-
tection. Substantive limitations would also result if courts were
to view the student-university relationship as similar to that
between a beneficiary and his fiduciary, or if an analogy were
to be drawn to municipal corporations.
131. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968); Dickey
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967);




The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits the re-
strictions a university can place on a student's exercise of
constitutionally guaranteed rights. It states that the enjoyment
of a benefit or privilege provided by government may not be
conditioned upon the waiver or relinquishment of a consti-
tutional right except where justified by an overriding societal
interest.132 Applied to the educational context, this means that
once a state establishes a university, it may not condition
attendance on the abandonment of constitutionally protected
rights. 3 3 Where a limitation is imposed on a constitutional
right as a precondition to the receipt of some benefit, the
restriction must be justified by a countervailing interest that
is substantially and directly connected with the restriction. 3 4
If, for example, the exercise of a constitutional right could be
shown to interfere materially and substantially with the edu-
cational function of the university, a regulation abridging that
exercise could be condoned. 35
Thus, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides
the student with a minimum area of freedom which the insti-
tution may not invade. It is clear, for example, that a university
regulation prohibiting students from attending an orderly off-
campus political rally would violate the doctrine because it
would condition attendance on relinquishment of the first
amendment protections of freedom of speech and association.
36
132. Id. See also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
133. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956); Wieman v. Upde-
graft, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273
F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Hammond v. South Carolina State
College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Note, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 73 I-HIv. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
134. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Goldberg v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
135. Compare Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) with
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
136. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). A regulation which required or pro-
hibited student attendance at religious services would violate substan-
tive due process respecting the establishment or separation of religion.
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
A public institution could neither prevent a student from travel-
ing where he desires when out of class, nor from choosing his own
associates. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);
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Several recent decisions have invoked the doctrine in similar
circumstances. In Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion,137 a student editor was suspended for attempting to publish
an editorial which offended the faculty advisor. Although it
was said that he was suspended for "insubordination," the only
rule he actually violated was one that prohibited editorial
criticism of officers of the state. The court, in ordering rein-
statement, held that a state could not require a college student
to forfeit his constitutional right to freedom of speech as a
condition to his attending a state-supported institution.
State school officials cannot infringe on their students' right of
free and unrestricted expression ... where the exercise of such
right does not materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operations of the
school. 138
In Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California,130
the court recognized that where the exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms would interfere with order and discipline, a
restriction on freedom of expression could validly be imposed.
In that case, student members of the "Filthy Speech Movement"
were suspended for conducting a loud, obscene, and disorderly
rally on campus. The court upheld the suspension on the ground
that the rally was calculated to disrupt the educational functions
of the university, a purpose which the university can legitimately
proscribe. The Goldberg court suggested that
the test is whether conditions annexed to the benefit reasonably
tend to further the purposes sought by conferment of that benefit
and whether the utility of imposing the conditions manifestly
outweighs any resulting impairment of constitutional rights. 140
In this case, the benefit conferred was the educational oppor-
tunity, and the limitation on loudspeakers and rallies in close
proximity to the library and classrooms was reasonably cal-
culated to "further the purpose sought by conferment of that
benefit."
In Hammond v. South Carolina State College,141 the college
prohibited all "parades, celebrations and demonstrations" with-
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941).
137. 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
138. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
139. 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
140. Id. at 471. The case was actually decided on the rationale of
the Sound Truck Case, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 777 (1941), that the
restriction was necessary to the maintenance of minimum standards
of order and propriety.
141. 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
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out the prior approval of the college's administrative officials.
Students suspended for conducting an unapproved demonstra-
tion were reinstated when the court found that "the rule under
which these students were suspended was incompatible with
the constitutional guarantees and is invalid.' 42 The court held
that the approval requirement was a prior restraint on the
exercise of a first amendment right. 43 In response to the
college's objection that they had the same right as a private
citizen to control the use of their property, and that the campus
was dedicated to scholarship and learning, the court held that
assembling at the site of government for peaceful expression of
grievances constituted exercise of first amendment rights in
their pristine form. [We are] not persuaded that the campus
of a state college is not similarly available for the same pur-
poses for its students. 144
Thus, when universities impose limitations on "preferred" lib-
erties, courts place the burden on the institutions to demon-
strate the overriding need for subordination by showing that
the interest they are trying to protect is materially and sub-
stantially related to their educational functions. 45
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions protects the stu-
dent only in his exercise of constitutional rights. It does not
protect him from dismissal for conduct which is not consti-
tutionally protected, or which may be in violation of state or
federal law. 40 To some extent, however, dismissal for such
142. Id. at 950.
143. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Hammond may actually stand for the
proposition that students have a right to demonstrate on campus. Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). The Court rejected the
defendant school's argument that they could control the use of their
property like a private owner and could therefore legitimately prohibit
demonstrations. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The Court
held, rather, that students, like citizens, could assemble at the seat of
government and petition for redress of grievances.
144. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 951
(D.S.C. 1967).
145. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See also Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (1966); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273
F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
146 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the
Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Con-
siderations, 2 LAW in TRA~s. Q. 1, 25-26 (1965). See also Due v.
Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (school
catalogue specifically provided disciplinary sanctions for violations of
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conduct may be limited by requirements of equal protection.
Simply stated, equal protection "insulates individuals from
arbitrary limitations on opportunities supplied by government
as well as from arbitrary limitations on opportunities individuals
or groups are otherwise capable of providing for themselves. 147
Thus, when the state undertakes t'o provide a benefit, such as
education, it must do so equally for all. One example of an
arbitrary limitation on a governmental educational opportunity
is the situation in Brown v. Board of Education,'148 where state-
sanctioned racial segregation was invalidated as an arbitrary
classification. Even when a rule or classification does have
some relationship to a legitimate state interest, it may still be
invalidated as a violation of equal protection if it is found to
be "comparatively" arbitrary, harsh or unessential. 1 49  The ul-
timate question is whether the classification is arbitrary or
discriminatory. 50 The equal protection clause requires that
the rule making power of the university be used only to control
conduct within the scope of institutional authority and in
state or federal law); Knight v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 200 F.
Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (students disciplined for trespass convic-
tions arising out of "freedom rides").
147. Van Alstyne, supra note 146, at 27. See also Developments-
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1135 (1968).
148. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
149. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), where a state
statute granting the opportunity to appeal criminal convictions re-
quired appellant to pay for the trial court transcript. The regulation
was stricken as being a denial of equal protection to indigents despite
the fact that it was reasonably related to the legitimate state interest
of reducing the cost of the appellate process.
If an institution, for a reason unrelated to academic competence,
denies admission or dismisses a student, that too would be arbitrary
and a violation of equal protection. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). See also Kellett, The Expan-
sion of Equality, 37 So. CAL. L. REV. 400 (1964).
150. Professor Van Alstyne, supra note 146, at 33, suggests that
when evaluating an institutional regulation which carries the sanction of
dismissal, comparative or absolute denial of equal protection may be
found by reference to several criteria:
(1) the legitimacy of the purpose served by the rule; (2)
the relative significance of that purpose in discharging the
lawful functions of the university; (3) the substantiality of the
connection between that purpose and the general or particular
conduct forbidden by the rule; (4) the substantiality of the con-
nection between that purpose and the punishment prescribed
by the rule; (5) the relative importance to the individual stu-
dent-citizen of the activity which he is forbidden to pursue; (6)
the relative importance of the interest which will be denied
him if he violates the rule; (7) the availability of alternative
means for protecting the university's legitimate interests, with-




furtherance of the educational goals of the university. Thus,
if a student were sanctioned under a rule requiring expulsion
for violation of the criminal law, reinstatement would be jus-
tified unless, at the same time, the student had abused a priv-
ilege extended to him by the university. 51 Moreover, if a
properly punishable offense were committed against the uni-
versity by a group of students, equal protection would require
identical disposition of each student's case. 1 52
C. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
Protection of students' rights may also be secured as a result
of a reappraisal of the relationship between the student and the
university. As indicated previously, in loco parentis and con-
tract theories have proven inadequate to the task of protecting
the university's interest while at the same time preserving stu-
dents' rights and opportunities. Several commentators have
suggested the student-university relationship should be viewed
as a fiduciary relationship, a "benevolent in loco parentis."'5 3
A fiduciary is defined as "a person having a duty, created by
151. When students choose to participate in activities that result
in police action ... it is an infringement on their liberty for the
college to punish such activity .... [N]ot every conviction
under law is... an offense with which an educational institu-
tion must concern itself....
A.C.L.U., AcADEmac FREEoi mm CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS nq COL-
LEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 11 (1961); see Monypenny, Toward a Stand-
ard for Student Academic Freedom, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 625, 629
(1963); Van Alstyne, supra note 146, at 27. Professor Monypenny finds
it ".... doubtful whether even ordinary criminal offenses off campus
should carry any automatic academic penalty. The particular concern of
the scholarly community is offenses against scholarship and against the
conditions of scholarship." 28 LAw & CoNTEM. PRoB. at 629.
152. See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo.
1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 203 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968). 'Equal protection of the law guarantees against invidious
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law may
not lay an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the
same quality of offense." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
As the court in Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747, 766-67 (W.D. La. 1968), noted, however, equal protection
would not require a university to suspend its entire student body in
order to dismiss the ringleaders of a student demonstration. By anal-
ogy to employers firing the leaders of "wild-cat" labor strikes with-
out violating equal protection, university administrators could single out
student leaders. See, e.g., Packers Hide Ass'n v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 59
(8th Cir. 1966); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir.
1953).
153. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY. L.J. 643 (1965); Seavey, Dismissal of Stu-
dents: Due Process, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406, 1407 (1957).
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his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another in
matters connected with his undertaking."'15 4 The relationship
arises when one party reasonably places confidence in and re-
liance upon the integrity of the other party to act on his behalf
and for his benefit.155 It may also arise when by virtue of their
relationship, one party has control of and dominion over the
other. 5  When the relationship exists, equity imposes an obli-
gation on the fiduciary to act for the best interests of the
beneficiary regardless of his own preference or advantage. In
the student-university context, the argument is that the student
places his trust and confidence in the educators, and relies on
the institution to perform satisfactorily the duties owed him.
The fiduciary relationship derives either from the reliance of
the student on the university or from the university's domina-
tion and control of the student's present and future activities. 5 7
As Professor Seavey observes,
a fiduciary is one whose function it is to act for the benefit of
another as to matters relevant to the relation between them.
Since schools exist primarily for the education of their students,
it is obvious that professors and administrators act in a fidu-
ciary capacity with reference to the students.158
The attractiveness of this analysis lies in its applicability to
both public and private institutions. When confronted with
student misconduct, the university could maintain the necessary
degree of order and discipline by reference to its fiduciary
obligations to the student body as a whole. This view would
confine the activities of the universities to those areas consistent
with their fiduciary obligations, namely supplying the facilities,
faculty and means of providing a higher education. It would
require the courts to review disciplinary actions of a serious
nature to determine whether the university conducted itself as
a fiduciary in dealing with the accused students.159 Moreover,
154. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY (SECOND) § 13, comment a (1958).
155. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc,, 166 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1948);
In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 P. 583 (1922); Higgins v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 312 Ill. 11, 143 N.E. 482 (1924).
156. See, e.g., Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky. 274, 242 S.W. 594 (1922).
See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 62, 63 (1947); G. BOGERT,
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 12-14 (2d ed. 1965).
157. Goldman, supra note 153, at 671.
158. Seavey, supra note 153, at 1407 n.3. This statement does not
entirely reflect the nature of the relationship. A beneficiary is neces-
sarily passive, owing no obligation to his fiduciary. There is consider-
ably more mutuality in the student-university relationship than in a
true fiduciary relationship.
159. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 544; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 570 (1932); Goldman, supra note 153, at 674.
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it would place the burden on the university to demonstrate that
its procedures and sanctions were appropriate. The combination
of these features would provide universities with all powers
necessary to perform their educational functions. Any limi-
tations on present powers would be in those areas where uni-
versity action is unjustified because unrelated to the educational
process. Thus, under the fiduciary theory, a violation of law
which does not involve an interference with the institution's
educational function would not require university involvement.
D. MuNIciPAL CORPORATIONS-ULTRA VIREs
An analogy can be drawn between limitations imposed on
the regulatory powers of public educational institutions and on
those of municipal corporations or other administrative agencies.
As branches of state government, all are designed to perform
designated tasks by means of delegations of state power.160 The
delegations, whether to city councils or school boards, must be
for relatively specific purposes and all administrative acts must
be designed to achieve those purposes.' 6 ' In the case of mu-
nicipalities, the courts require that ordinances passed under
delegated authority must bear a "clear, reasonable, and sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare
and must be reasonably appropriate for the police power ob-
jectives sought to be attained ..... 162 If an act is designed to
achieve these ends and is addressed to an objective intra vires,
or within its power, it will be presumptively valid, although
courts will still inquire whether there is a substantial relation
between the ordinance and the police power purposes. 163 Every
ordinance based on the police power may be challenged on the
grounds of its reasonableness and may be "invalidated if it
has no substantial relation" to the objectives it is designed to
achieve.16 4
160. See, e.g., Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); United
States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (1879); Barnes v. District of Colum-
bia, 91 U.S. 540 (1876).
161. K. DAvis, Aim unSTRATiV LAW § 2 (3d ed. 1959).
162. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Bryan v. Birmingham,
154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922 (1908); C. RHYNE, MuNicWiAL LAW 538 (3d ed.
1957).
163. RHYNE, supra note 162, at 540. See, e.g., Warren v. Philadelphia,
382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955); Adams v. New Kensington, 357 Pa.
557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947); Rapid City v. Schmitt, 75 S.D. 636, 71 N.W.2d
297 (1955).
164. RHYNE, supra note 162, at 539 (emphasis added); see Atlantic




The mandate to a university's board of trustees, although
for a different purpose, is as broad as the delegation of power
to a municipality. An institutional grant of power is usually
couched in terms of the "rights, privileges, powers and duties
customarily . . . exercised by governing boards of institutions
of higher learning,"'165 thus giving the board full power to
administer the institution. Despite their specialized objectives,
universities exercise discretionary powers which are strikingly
similar to those exercised by municipalities. Many schools have
their own police forces and traffic ordinances. They provide
for the health, safety, and welfare of the student by furnishing
medical centers, traffic controls and job placement centers.
The court in Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University,'ll
although rejecting it as a basis for federal jurisdiction, noted
plaintiff's argument that "insofar as the powers it exercises
over students . . . defendant Columbia University . . .may be
likened to a 'company town' ... .117 Because of the similarities
between the powers of municipal corporations and universities,
it seems that the standards employed by the judiciary in con-
struing the validity of municipal exercises of power could
logically be applied to those of a university.
Courts have created a presumption of reasonableness for
exercises of discretion by school administrators. 16 8  Nonethe-
less, courts have, on occasion, applied standards similar to those
employed in evaluating municipal police power ordinances.
Essentially, the inquiry seeks to determine whether promulga-
tion of a given rule is reasonably related to the achievement of
an objective sought by the delegation of power. In Knight v.
Tennessee State Board of Education,69 the court stated that
there must be a reasonable connection between the conduct
condemned by the rule and the educational interests the school
is trying to protect before a student can be dismissed for viola-
tion of the rule. In State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne,70 the court
165. MAss GEN. LAw AwN. ch. 75, § 1 (1966). See also PA. STAT.
A-N. tit. 24, § 5-510 (1962), which authorized the governing board to
"adopt and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem
necessary and proper, regarding the management of its school affairs.
166. 68 Civ. 1877 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
167. Id.
168. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. W. Va. 1968);
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D. Ct. App.
1967).
169. 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
170. 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887).
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found that the school had exceeded its rule making authority
when it required students to obtain institutional permission
before attending any social function. The court in Burnside v.
Byars'7 1 held that a reasonable regulation is one which measur-
ably contributes to the maintenance of order and discipline in
the school.
If the analogy is extended to private corporations or associa-
tions, similar limitations on university regulatory powers can
be extrapolated. A private corporation's activities are limited
by its articles of incorporation. Any activities not provided
for in the articles are ultra vires and void.172  A university,
viewed as a corporation, is only empowered to "provide" edu-
cation. Thus, regulations made for purposes other than edu-
cation are void. If the institution were viewed as a private
association, it could be restricted by substantive limitations
on the kinds of disciplinary sanctions it can impose on its
members. The validity of a group's sanctions are measured by
reference to the group's purposes or objectives. 7 3  If the
punishment imposed-suspension or expulsion-cannot be justi-
fied by reference to the group's essential purpose-education-
judicial relief is appropriate.
Many courts, however, have ignored the reasonableness of
the relationship between a university regulation and the ob-
jectives it is designed to foster. Instead of inquiring whether
a rule "measurably contributes" to educational objectives, courts
have been prone to regard disciplinary rules as having inde-
pendent educational value, apart from their relevance to the
educational process. 74
VI. JUDICIAL STANDARD FOR EVALUATION-
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL RELATION
In formulating a judicial test for university regulations, it
is first necessary to resolve questions of jurisdiction.1 5 There
are a number of obvious areas which are the exclusive concern
171. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
172. See, e.g., R. BAKER & W. CARY, CoRpoRATuONS 362 (3d ed.
1959); H. BALLANTnqE, CoRPonATIONS § 42 (1949).
173. See, e.g., Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930); Developments-Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 H-I~v. L. REV. 983, 1006-20 (1963).
174. Developments-Judicial Control of Actions of Private As-
sociations, 76 HAnv. L. REV. 983, 1014 (1963).
175. See Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CArF.
L. REv. 1, 29-32 (1966).
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of the institution or the civil authorities. Academic matters,
such as cheating or plagiarism, should be dealt with by the
university. Criminal conduct should be left to the civil author-
ities. There are, however, areas of jurisdictional overlap in
which the academic sanctions of suspension or expulsion may
properly be imposed for non-academic conduct which interferes
with educational activities. An extreme example of this would
be participation in a campus riot.176 It would be appropriate in
these areas of concurrent and overlapping civil and institutional
interest that the university allow civil prosecution and still
take steps to protect its own functions and facilities. 177
In assessing the relationship between a rule that carries the
threat of dismissal and an institution's educational mission, a
university could clearly condition continued enrollment upon
satisfactory performance of academic responsibilities. Since it
provides educational facilities, the university could also take
appropriate disciplinary steps to ensure their proper utilization.
Where, however, the conduct in question is neither related to
nor disruptive of academic activities, university-imposed punish-
ment is uncalled for.178 Students who violate the law will, and
should incur whatever penalties are prescribed. The university,
however, should not exercise its power of dismissal simply be-
cause it disapproves of the proscribed conduct where that con-
duct does not involve an abuse of institutional facilities or
176. Grossner v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 68 Civ. 1877 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D.
Ct. App. 1967).
177. Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALMS. L.
Ruv. 1, 43 (1966). The author there stated that
The University's basic purpose is the transmission of knowl-
edge and understanding and the development of intellectual
and rational capacity.... The University should clearly dis-
tinguish disciplinary action to protect university functions
from general law enforcement, and should treat students as being
separately accountable to the two.
Accord, Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
178. Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1132
(1968).
The student's conduct off campus should justify expulsion
only if it indicates his unfitness to be a member of the aca-
demic community. School discipline should have as its only
aim the deterrence of conduct, or removal of persons, harmful
to the university, and not mere duplication of civil and crimi-
nal penalties.
See also Statement on The Academic Freedom of Students, 51
A.A.U.P. BULL. 447, 449 (1965); Symposium: Student Rights and Cam-
pus Rules, 54 CALv. L. REv. 1, 38 (1966).
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opportunities.179 The schools should confine their disciplinary
activities to conduct strongly related to academic interests.
179. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643, 676 (1965); Monypenny, Toward a
Standard for Student Academic Freedom, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
625, 629 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Rights and University Authority,
2 COLLEGE COUNSEL 44, 54 (1967).
Absent comprehensive decisions in this area, fact hypotheticals will
have to illustrate the relation of rules, propounded under a substantial
and material interest standard, to various forms of student behavior. At
one extreme is conduct which has a substantial and material impact on
educational functions. University regulations proscribing such conduct
would clearly be in order. An example would be a disruptive and
disorderly demonstration "on-campus" which directly interferes with on-
going classroom activities. At the other extreme would be a rule pro-
hibiting all "off-campus" criminal activity and providing for dismissal.
A student's conviction for violation of a traffic ordinance would not
normally have any impact on the institution, so as to justify such sanc-
tions. It is between these poles, significant disruption on-campus, and
non-existent interference off-campus, that the line must be drawn.
A university regulation, designed to protect university property and
educational resources, could be framed to prohibit the theft of library
books or laboratory equipment. The deprivation caused by such theft
would engender a material interference with the educational opportuni-
ties of others. On the other hand, theft of books from a privately
owned, "off-campus" bookstore would be irrelevant to the university's
educational mission. It might even be questionable whether theft from
a university owned and operated bookstore would be a basis for im-
posing academic sanctions. In these situations, a complaint by the store
owner or by the university, instigating criminal prosecution would be
the appropriate recourse. Since the university has no educational basis
for sanctioning the specific conduct in question, it follows that disci-
plinary action based on the criminal conviction would be equally un-
warranted.
A similar, if more controversial, type of situation might be pre-
sented in institutional attempts to regulate student morals, such as the
off-campus "social" activities of its students. Where the students' off-
campus, extra-curricular activities do not interfere with the university's
educational function, there would be no basis for sanctions. Another
example in this realm might involve student use of marijuana. The le-
gality or illegality of this conduct is irrelevant to the university disci-
plinary functions. Rather, the judgment should be based solely on
whether there is a substantial and material relation between the con-
duct proscribed and a university goal. Thus, if a student simply in-
dulges privately, then it is a matter between him and the civil authori-
ties. On the other hand, if the student is distributing to other students
and using the campus as a place to make contacts, then the university
has a material interest.
In summary, this standard requires that conduct a university regu-
lates must have a substantial and material relation to the educational
mission. In most instances, it is unlikely that off-campus behavior will
have such an impact as to require regulation. Even as to on-campus
behavior, there may be many situations that do not interfere with educa-
tion. In such instances, institutional rules which merely duplicate ex-




In light of the caveats discussed above, when should uni-
versities exercise disciplinary powers? The most frequent and
problematical situation involves off-campus conduct which may
or may not have violated a law. The court in Buttny v. Smiley'8 °
recognized that "the doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer
tenable in a university community," and noted the increasing
trend "to reject the authority of university officials to regulate
'off-campus' activity of students." At the same time, however,
the court said that conduct tending to disrupt the order and
discipline of a campus should be subject to disciplinary control,
and that the institution could make regulations to this end.' 8 '
In achieving objectives of an educational institution, a rule
should measurably contribute to a material and substantial in-
terest of the university. A material and substantial interest
exists where the behavior proscribed would directly interfere
with the educational process which the university is attempting
to foster.8 2 One author has stated that
violations of certain rules of the outside community ... are of
little significance to the University's functions and objectives.
Similarly, certain conduct that violates no laws of the external
community ... is properly proscribed by and disciplined by the
University as it interferes with the University's basic educa-
tional purpose.' 8 3
It is only infrequently that off-campus misconduct interferes
with the university's educational role. 8 4
180. 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (1968).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 472 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967): "The University has the power to formu-
late and enforce rules of student conduct that are appropriate and neces-
sary to the maintenance of order and propriety . . . where such rules
are reasonably necessary to further the University's educational goals."
183. Id. at 476.
184. Monypenny, Toward A Standard For Student Academic Free-
dom, 28 LAw & CONTEAv. PROB. 625, 629 (1963). Professor Monypenny
suggests that
The particular concern of the scholarly community is offenses
against scholarship and against the conditions of scholarship.
It would seem to promote maturity to let [criminal] of-
fenses be a private matter between the student and civil au-
thority.
Goldman, supra note 179, at 675, would require that the university
"demonstrate that its exercise of disciplinary powers constitutes conduct
necessary and proper to the process of providing higher education." In
the Statement on The Academic Freedom of Students, 51 A.A.U.P.
BuLL. 447, 449 (1965), the American Association of University Profes-
sors stated that
Institutional authority should never be used merely to dupli-
cate the function of general laws. Only where the institution's
interests as an academic community are distinct from those of




Even when there is no direct relationship between miscon-
duct and academic affairs, the university may still feel some
compulsion to discipline the "offending" student. This may
stem from a feeling of obligation to the community derived
from previous institutional policies which may have led the
community to expect such retribution.185 It would be straining
the meaning of education, however, to establish a rule designed
solely to protect the "good name" of the institution, or the
harmony of alumni or community relations. 8 6 The university
should undertake to educate both its students and the com-
munity. The best way students can learn responsible citizenship
is by being responsible for their actions. Thus, if students
violate the law, they should be punished by the civil authorities,
not the university. Consistent adherence to such a policy would,
in turn, teach the non-academic community that the university
cannot and will not assume responsibility for the actions of its
students outside the educational environment.
In terms of court review, the burden of proof in the first
instance should be on the student to establish a prima facie
case of deprivation of some significant interest. An expulsion
or suspension, with the concomitant difficulty of re-enrollment
or transfer, and the economic and social consequences, would
certainly sustain this burden.187 The university should then be
required to show how the conduct in question materially and
substantially infringed on the educational interests of the uni-
versity:
An institution, in formulating and enforcing rules, must be
able to justify those rules on the merits; on the merits as being
distinctly related to a proper concern of an educational institu-
tion and not "on the merits" in the strained sense that while
185. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 175, at 57-62, for a report of
such an instance.
186. See, e.g., Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judi-
cial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. at 1402-03 (1963).
Darrow v. Briggs, 261 Mo. 244, 273, 169 S.W. 118, 124 (1914), stands for
the proposition that a school may dismiss a student to protect the "good
name" of the institution.
But see Goldman supra note 179, at 677; Symposium, supra note 175,
at 30, 38. Van Alstyne, supra note 179, at 53 feels that
The adverse reaction of third parties to the coincidental identi-
fication of the persons in trouble does not entitle a particular
State Agency to attempt to protect what it regards as its inter-
est by yielding to the misunderstanding; the false attribution of
responsibility made by the community at large which may
take vengeful action against a public university does not justify
a university in turn to take vengeful action against its students.
Accord, Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).




we cannot show how a given rule really contributed to enhanc-
ing educational opportunities or maximizing the educational ad-
vancement of our students, we defend it only in the sense that
if we do not have such a rule, the community will think ill of
US .... 188
The requirement of a demonstration of substantial and material
interest may, by itself, deter institutions from formulating rules
which only duplicate those of enforcement agencies without
protecting any separate interests or responsibilities. This, in
turn, would prevent infliction of multiple punishments for a
single offense, as may presently occur when civil authorities
and the institutions impose sanctions simultaneously. Finally,
and most importantly, this approach would free resources now
wasted on policing activities to be used for the overall improve-
ment of the educational process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent decisions have cited with approval the definition of
a university and its rule making power offered in a symposium
entitled Student Rights and Campus Rules.189 Balancing the
interests and needs of all concerned, one author suggested the
following:
Broadly stated, the mission of the university is to impart learn-
ing and to advance the boundaries of knowledge. This car-
ries with it the administrative responsibility to control and
regulate whatever conduct and behavior of the members of
the university family impedes, obstructs, or threatens the
achievement of its educational goals. In turn, it is the re-
sponsibility of students and faculty to refrain from conduct
that obstructs or interferes with the educational and research
objectives of the university, which impairs the full develop-
ment of the mutual process of teaching and learning, or which
imposes restraints upon the advancement of knowledge .... 100
This simple statement at once delimits the purposes of a uni-
versity, the objectives toward which its regulatory powers may
be applied, and the responsibilities of every member of the
academic community to respect these objectives. University
rules, written with specificity, and substantially and materially
related to fostering the educational goals of the institution,
would be readily accepted by students, faculty and adminis-
188. Van Alstyne, supra note 179, at 54.
189. Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CAm. L.
REV. 1 (1966). See, e.g., Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
190. Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights and Re-
sponsibilities, 54 CALiF. L. REV. 23, 27 (1966).
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trators alike as a part of their mutual responsibility in securing
and providing an education.
It is clear, however, that if administrators and institutions
are unwilling to adopt a standard of "reasonableness" measured
by the directness of the relationship to education; if universities
continue to rely on vague references to "misconduct unbecoming
a student" as their touchstone for disciplinary action; and if
institutions insist on imposing regulations designed to silence the
emerging generation and stifle their political participation; such
rules and regulations will be met by continuing campus unrest,
confrontation, and "intense reaction that goes almost to the
point of rejecting the authority of the university to make any
rules at all."'191 The choice now lies with the universities.
191. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 755
(W.D. La. 1968).
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